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In most countries the number of places at the universities is re-
stricted. This paper estimates the eﬀect of university enrollment
constraints in 1982 on years of education and earnings in Sweden
1981-96. The eﬀect on educational attainment is related to labor
market performance, to estimate the eﬀect of education on earnings.
The variation used is driven by discrete jumps in the admission selec-
tion to university. The results show that university enrollment con-
straints aﬀect educational attainment over the entire period studied.
In 1996, admitted applicants in 1982 have about one quarter of a
year longer education than screened out applicants. The eﬀect of
enrollment constraints changes with time. In the end of the panel,
admitted applicants in 1982 are no better oﬀ than screened out ap-
plicants. The estimated return to education in Sweden is very low,
both with least square and instrumental variable techniques.
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2 IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings?1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In most countries the number of places at the universities is restricted.
Some countries like Finland, Greece, Portugal and Sweden have centrally
decided numerus clauses in all or most ﬁelds of study, while others like
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the US let the
individual institutions set the enrollment constraints themselves (Kirstein,
1999). The degree of selectivity varies between diﬀerent institutions and
countries. In Finland, for example, only 30 per cent of the applications
are accepted (Statistics Finland, 1999). The acceptance rate is about 75
per cent in the UK (Higher Education Statistics Agency, 2001). In the
US, even the lowest ranked universities in practice reject more than 10 per
cent of their applicants (Winston, 1999).
When enrollment is restricted, students are allocated to university on
the basis of either prices or performance indicators. The price for higher
education is often low in Europe, which is why test scores or grades are
used to select which individuals to admit. In the US, on the other hand,
both prices and performance indicators are used to allocate students to
university (Fernández, 1998). Although most institutions of higher edu-
cation select their students, little is known about the eﬀect of restricted
admission on educational attainment and earnings.1 This study estimates
the impact of university enrollment constraints in 1982 on educational at-
tainment and labor market performance, as well as the eﬀect of education
on earnings, in Sweden 1981-96. The variation used is driven by discrete
jumps in the admission selection to university.
The 1977 Higher Education Act introduced enrollment constraints to
all university studies in Sweden as well as standardized rules of eligibility
and admission. Roughly 80 per cent of all available places were allocated
centrally by two admissions authorities, while the universities ﬁlled the
remaining places locally. Since the admission selection was centralized,
applicants could in principle only be admitted to one program at one
university at the time. The degree of selectivity at all universities was -
and still is - high, not at least since tuition is free of charge and since all
students are oﬀered rather generous student grants. As a consequence, no
more than half the pool of applicants a given year has gained admission to
1To my knowledge only two studies are directly (or indirectly) devoted to labor
market eﬀects of university enrollment constraints and admission selection. Dale and
Krueger (1999) use student application behavior and college admission decisions to
control for unobserved characteristics when estimating the eﬀect of attending a more
selective college. Bowen and Bok (1998) analyze the eﬀects in the education and labor
markets of using race in college admissions.
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probably constitute a binding restriction for many people in Sweden - not
only at a given point of time - but also in the long run.
University enrollment is typically non-random. If there is enrollment
constraints, the allocation of individuals to university involves both self-
selection and admission selection. Both of these selection mechanisms
must be accounted for to ﬁnd the causal eﬀects of enrollment constraints
and the eﬀect of education on earnings. The identifying strategy in this
paper involves three steps. First, admitted applicants are compared to
diﬀerent groups of non-admitted individuals, to diﬀer out common unob-
served determinants of self-selection to university (as well as diﬀerences
in eligibility status). The university enrollment constraints and the selec-
tion of students to university generate a number of candidate comparison
groups - non-applicants, non-eligible applicants and screened out applic-
ants - that resembles the admitted applicants to diﬀerent extent. In par-
ticular non-admitted applicants are well suited as a comparison group for
admitted applicants, since all those involved are self-selected for higher
education.
Second, dummy variables for all combinations of educational alternat-
ives and admission quota groups are added to the model. This is because
individuals diﬀer, not only in whether they apply to university or not, but
also in which universities and programs they prefer as well as in their edu-
cational background. Conditional on these characteristics, the admission
decision lies in the hands of the admissions authorities. This means that
admitted applicants to a particular alternative in a given admission quota
group have a comparison group ”of their own” consisting of non-admitted
applicants to the very same alternative and quota group.
Third, admission selection is controlled for using the same informa-
tion and selection rules as did the admissions authorities. Eligible applic-
ants were ranked with respect to their formal merits, and admission was
given to applicants who were ranked higher than some threshold value (de-
termined by the number of places available). All the admission selection
determinants for eligible applicants are available in the data. Since the
admission status is deterministic given the observed underlying variables,
the eﬀects of enrollment constraints can be identiﬁed using a regression-
discontinuity design (Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960).
The discrete jumps in admission status can, apart from being used to
ﬁnd causal eﬀects of enrollment constraints on educational attainment and
labor market performance, also be used to estimate the eﬀect of education
on earnings. If years of education changes discontinuously at the break-
4 IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings?point of the entry credits, admission status in 1982 is a valid instrument
for education given smooth functions of the admission selection variables.
Since the instrument is dichotomous, the estimator is given by the ratio
between the eﬀect of university enrollment constraints on earnings and
their eﬀect on years of education.
The results show that university enrollment constraints in 1982 af-
fected educational attainment in the short as well as in the long run. In
1996, admitted applicants in 1982 on average have one quarter of a year
longer education than screened out applicants. The eﬀects of enrollment
constraints on earnings diﬀer with time. In the years following the admis-
sion selection in 1982, there is an earnings dip for admitted applicants.
They catch up in the late 1980s and get ahead until the late 1980s. In
1988 the eﬀect of enrollment constraints on earnings is estimated at almost
11,000 SEK. The eﬀect then peters out and is completely eliminated in
the end of the panel. The observed pattern can probably be attributed
to diﬀerences in university enrollment rates over time. Since the eﬀect of
university enrollment constraints on years of education has no parallel in
earnings, the estimated return to education using admission status as an
i n s t r u m e n tf o re d u c a t i o ni sv e r yl o w( a l t h o u g hm e a s u r e dw i t hl o wp r e c i -
sion). However, if the sample is restricted to those who earn more than
100,000 SEK in 1996, the least squares estimates suggests that the return
to education is no higher than 1.7 per cent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the enroll-
ment constraints and the admission selection to university in Sweden in
1982 is described. The empirical strategy and the econometric models are
given in Section 3, while Section 4 describes the data and reports some
descriptive statistics. The results are given in Section 5 and Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 University enrollment constraints and admis-
sion selection in Sweden
Higher education in Sweden is provided by public universities and uni-
versity colleges.2 The studies are free of charge,3 and student grants are
available for all students in the form of allowances and loans. At the
undergraduate level, students can choose between programs and single-
2The main diﬀerence between them is that university colleges generally do not
provide graduate education. I will use the term university throughout the paper.
3There is a small fee to the student union.
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degree on successful completion of a full program. The courses are usually
shorter but can be combined to a full degree.
Historically, admission to higher education in Sweden has been unres-
tricted. As the high school system expanded and the size of the cohorts
increased, the question of enrollment constraints was brought up in the
late 1960s. The 1977 Higher Education Act introduced enrollment con-
straints to all university studies in Sweden as well as standardized rules
of eligibility and admission.4 The programs and courses available, their
curriculum and length as well as the number of places at diﬀerent pro-
grams and universities were set by the Government. The admission to
university took place twice a year, with most places being allocated in
the fall semester. To be eligible to study at the universities, the students
had to complete at least two years of high school. Good knowledge in
subjects of particular importance to the studies in question was generally
also required. All individuals had to apply for admission to the admissions
authorities or to the universities. The National Swedish Board of Univer-
sities and Colleges (NSBUC) (Universitets- och högskoleämbetet, UHÄ)
administered the applications for most of the places available in higher
education.5
Applicants to the NSBUC could apply for admission to a maximum of
twelve diﬀerent educational alternatives.6 All applicants were assigned to
one or more of nine admission quota groups, depending on their educa-
tional background. There were two quotas for applicants with short high
school, two for individuals with long high school, one for those with a
particular form of adult education (folkhögskola) two for returning adults,
and three for other applicants. The intention of the quota group system
was to give individuals with diﬀerent backgrounds an equal opportunity
to study at the universities. One particular goal was to counteract the
4With the 1993 Higher Education Act the selection of applicants has become some-
what more liberal.
5In the fall of 1982, the NSBUC ﬁlled about 60 per cent of all available places at
Swedish universities. In addition, the NSBUC handled admissions to about 6 per cent
of places subject to special admission rules. The other central admissions authority,
the Association of County Councils’ admissions board for higher education (Landst-
ingsförbundets antagningsnämnd), handled admissions to municipally administered un-
dergraduate programs covering around 13 per cent of available places. Finally, about
21 per cent of the places were in the form of programs or separate courses allocated by
the universities themselves.
6An educational alternative means a particular program at a particular university.
In the autumn of 1982 there were 136 diﬀerent programs distributed over 35 universities,
amounting altogether to 466 diﬀerent educational alternatives.
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as well as the relative number of applicants settled the allocation of places
among the quota groups.
If the number of applicants for an alternative in a given quota group
exceeded the places available, applicants were ranked according to their
entry credits. The entry credits consisted of diﬀerent components in dif-
ferent quota groups, namely grade point averages from high school (GPA),
scholastic aptitude test scores (SAT), evaluations of earlier performance,
and credits for work experience. The higher the entry credits, the higher
the ranking. Applicants with the same credits were separated by their
ordering of the alternative in relation to the other alternatives for which
they had applied. However, if two or more applicants had the same credits
and the same ordering of an alternative, their priority in the competition
for places was determined by drawing lots, see Öckert (2001). The ad-
mission rule was to admit applicants who were ranked higher than some
threshold value (given by the places available).
The admission selection process consisted of four rounds. The ﬁrst
three were conducted by the NSBUC, and the last one by the universities
themselves. In the ﬁrst two rounds all eligible applicants competed for
admission to a maximum of twelve alternatives. An applicant gained ad-
mission if he or she was ranked higher than the number of places available.
Lower ordered alternatives, to which an individual had applied, were then
automatically cancelled. In the third round, the non-admitted applicants
could remain on the waiting list for (at most) two programs only. Un-
less the applicants wanted to reorder the alternatives, the originally two
highest ranked alternatives were kept. The universities then performed the
ﬁnal round of admissions, in which vacant places were allocated according
to a waiting list.
3 Econometric issues
Traditional human capital theory assumes that individuals can freely choose
the number of years of education so as to maximize the present value of
their net expected beneﬁts (e.g. Becker, 1962). Individuals are, in this
way, self-selected into diﬀerent levels of education on the basis of a number
of characteristics, such as outcome potential and the response to educa-
tion. In reality, there are restrictions on individual choices at most levels
of education (e.g. mandatory education or enrollment constraints), and
the years of education is determined by yet another set of characteristics.
Unless the whole selection mechanism is taken into account, estimates of
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Thus, to estimate the eﬀect of enrollment constraints of education and
earnings, and to estimate the eﬀect of education on earnings, both self-
selection and admission selection to university must be taken into account.
The identifying strategy in this paper involves three steps.
3.1 Using diﬀerent comparison groups
The ﬁrst step of the identiﬁcation strategy is to use diﬀerent comparison
groups to diﬀer out common unobserved determinants of self-selection to
university (as well as diﬀerences in eligibility status). The problem is to
ﬁnd a group of individuals who are similar to admitted applicants, but
who were not admitted. Studies of the return to higher education have
often used individuals who have chosen to attend lower levels of edu-
cation as comparison groups.7 The main problem with this approach is
that individuals with diﬀerent levels of education may diﬀer in unobserved
characteristics as well. When the number of places at the universities is
restricted, the admission process generates a number of candidate com-
parison groups. In particular non-admitted applicants are well suited as a
comparison group for admitted applicants, since all those involved are self-
selected for higher education.8 This study makes use of three comparison
groups for admitted applicants: non-applicants, non-eligible applicants
(non-eligibles) and screened out applicants (screen-outs).
The information available in the data diﬀers with respect to the com-
parison group. Non-applicants lack information on both educational pref-
erences and entry credits, while non-eligibles lack data on entry credits.
Therefore, the ﬁrst empirical model focuses on the eﬀect of using diﬀerent
comparison groups conditional on a few demographic characteristics only.
Consider a regression model that relates education or earnings to a num-
ber of observed and unobserved characteristics. Assume for now that the
eﬀect of enrollment constraints is equal for all individuals. The outcome
7Kane and Rouse (1995) and Leigh and Gill (1997) analyze the return to two and
four years of college compared to high school graduates. Blundell et al. (2000) use
individuals with the highest secondary school qualiﬁcation (A level) as the comparison
group for individuals with diﬀerent university qualiﬁcations.
8Non-participating program applicants have been used as comparison group also
in other studies, e.g. when evaluating the eﬀects of military service (Angrist, 1998),
private school vouchers (Rouse, 1998), training programs (Bell et al., 1995), disability
insurances (Bound, 1989), vocational rehabilitation programs (Dean and Dolan, 1991)
and child care services (Berger and Black, 1992).
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Yit = Xiβ + Diα + εit,( 1 )
where Yit is a measure of education or earnings, Xi is a vector of time
invariant demographic variables, Di is a dummy variable for admission
status in the fall of 1982, and εit is an individual speciﬁc error component.
In the empirical part of the paper I will denote this model OLS (ordinary
least squares).
As a benchmark, admitted applicants are compared to non-applicants.
This might be the only comparison group at hand, in the absence of in-
formation from the admission selection process. However, the study and
comparison groups diﬀer, not only in admission status, but also in ap-
plication behavior and eligibility status. Non-eligibles are more similar to
admitted applicants in that they have applied to university. On the other
hand they have not fulﬁlled the eligibility requirements, which a fraction
of the non-applicants have. The primary comparison group for admitted
applicants is the screened-out applicants, since they satisfy the eligibility
requirements and have applied for admission to university. However, they
diﬀer from admitted applicants in the admission selection. It is, thus,
not possible to a priori determine how the total bias is aﬀected by using
screen-outs instead of non-applicants or non-eligibles as comparison group
for admitted applicants.
3.2 Controlling for program preferences and educational
background
Individuals diﬀer, not only in whether they have applied to university or
not, but also in their educational background and their preferences for
diﬀerent universities and programs. Dale and Krueger (1999) show that
controlling for the set of colleges at which enrolled students were accepted
and rejected has a big impact on the estimated eﬀect of attending a more
selective college. The empirical strategy in this study diﬀers from theirs
in (at least) two ways. First, admitted applicants are compared to non-
admitted individuals (and not to other admitted applicants), to ﬁnd the
absolute (and not the relative) eﬀect of enrollment constraints. Second,
information of educational preferences is available not only for universities
but also for diﬀerent programs. There is also data on educational back-
ground.
The second step in the empirical strategy is to add dummy variables for
all combinations of educational alternatives and admission quota groups
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fects). The extension restricts the sample in two ways. First, information
on program preferences and educational background is available for ap-
plicants only, why non-applicants cannot be used as a comparison group.
Second, it is only possible to make these controls if there are more applic-
ants than places available within an alternative-quota group, otherwise
there will be no within-group variation in admission status. Therefore,
applicants to alternative-quota groups with fewer applicants than places
available (or with no applicants being admitted) are eliminated. The FE
model is given by:
Yit = Xiβ + Miγ + Diα + εit,( 2 )
where Mi is a vector of dummy variables for all combinations of educa-
tional alternatives and admission quota groups. The implication of the FE
model is that applicants to a particular alternative in a given admission
quota group have a comparison group ”of their own”, consisting of non-
admitted applicants to the very same alternative and in the very same
quota group. Hence, there are as many pairs of study and comparison
groups as there are alternative-quota groups.9
Comparing admitted applicants to diﬀerent groups of non-admitted ap-
plicants in combination with controlling for educational preferences leaves
no room for self-selection. Conditional on having applied to a particular
educational alternative and having been placed in a particular admission
quota group, the choice of admission lies in the hands of the admissions
authority. Even though the applicants’ willingness to pay for their uni-
versity studies probably varies, this has no direct eﬀect on who eventually
gains admission. Admission selection to university might, however, create
at least as big a bias in the estimates as self-selection might.
9When summing the admission-quota groups together, it is important that each
comparison group gets the same weight as its corresponding study group. However,
since the numbers of admitted and non-admitted applicants typically diﬀer within an
alternative-quota group, this need not to be the case. To make the study and the
comparison group means comparable - and to ﬁnd the eﬀect of treatment on the treated
- non-admitted applicants are related to the number of admitted applicants. This is
done by weighting the non-admitted applicants with the relative number of admitted to
non-admitted applicants in that alternative-quota group. Admitted applicants are left
unweighted.
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The ideal way to solve the problem of admission selection would be to ran-
domly admit applicants to university. The admitted applicants and the
non-admitted applicants would then on average have equal characterist-
ics, and taking the mean diﬀerence in education or earnings between them
would provide an unbiased estimate of the eﬀect of enrollment constraints.
In reality, however, admission to university is typically non-random, and
probably correlated with unobserved outcome potential or individual re-
sponse to treatment.
The admission selection rules in Sweden in the early eighties were clear
and simple. Eligible applicants were ranked with respect to their formal
merits and educational preferences, and admission was given to applic-
ants who were ranked higher than some threshold value (determined by
the number of places available). All the admission selection determinants
for eligible applicants are available in the data. Hence, admission status
is a deterministic function of observed underlying variables. Under the
assumption that economic behavior evolves smoothly, the eﬀects of enroll-
ment constraints can be identiﬁed using a (sharp) regression-discontinuity
design (Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960).
Identiﬁcation is attainable by noting that individuals just above the
cut-oﬀ point are similar on average to the ones just below, since they have
almost identical values on the admission selection variables. If the eﬀect of
the selection variables can be assumed to be continuous around the cut-oﬀ
point, the treatment eﬀect can be identiﬁed for individuals just above the
threshold. The mean outcome diﬀerence for marginal individuals, will then
provide an unbiased estimate of the mean eﬀect of enrollment constraints









E [Yit | Xi,M i,D i =0 ]=α,( 3 )
where zi is the admission selection variables and zo is the cut-oﬀ value.
Without any further assumptions the eﬀe c tc a no n l yb ei d e n t i ﬁed for those
at the cut-oﬀ point; the greater the distance from the threshold value, the
more biased the estimate may be.
What about heterogeneous treatment eﬀects? If the response to treat-
ment is heterogeneous with respect to the admission selection variables,
the eﬀect is only valid for those around the breakpoint. Hence, comparing
marginal applicants will identify the marginal eﬀect of treatment (ME).
However, if the response to treatment is heterogeneous only with respect
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lection variables, the estimated eﬀect of treatment is valid for all treated
individuals. This is because such variables do not aﬀect the allocation
of treatment, why treated individuals do not systematically diﬀer from
untreated individuals in this respect.
It is possible to use all observations in the sample to estimate the eﬀect
of enrollment constraints, under the assumption that including smooth
functions of the admission selection variables will remove their direct eﬀect
on the outcome. This can be viewed as a functional form assumption
that extrapolates the treatment eﬀect above and below the cut-oﬀ point.
If smooth functions of the admission selection variables will capture all
systematic diﬀerence in outcome potential between admitted and non-
admitted applicants, the eﬀect of treatment on the treated (TT) can be
identiﬁed even under heterogeneous response to treatment. Also, using
the entire sample will produce more precise estimates.
The third step of the empirical strategy in this paper is to control for
admission selection to university by adding ﬂexible speciﬁcations of the
admission selection variables to model (2). The model is denoted FE-RD
(ﬁxed eﬀects regression-discontinuity) and is given by:
Yit = Xiβ + Miγ + Ziδ + Diα + εit,( 4 )
where Zi is a vector of admission determinants. Due to data limitations,
non-eligibles cannot be used as a comparison group in this part of the
analysis.
A weakness of the RD design is that identiﬁcation is typically attain-
able around the breakpoint only, i.e. for a handful of marginal individuals
(Hoxby, 2000). The admission selection system in Sweden in 1982 can, at
least in part, overcome this problem. First, there is not only one threshold
value, but many. All combinations of alternatives and admission quota
groups, have a cut-oﬀ point of their own. It is, thus, possible to identify
the treatment eﬀect around almost 2,300 break-points. Second, applicants
to some alternative-quota groups have been randomly admitted to univer-
sity at the margin, due to having equal merits and the same educational
preferences and background (Öckert, 2001). There is, thus, some pure ran-
domness around the breakpoint in some cases. The eﬀect of enrollment
constraints is then attainable not only at the breakpoint, but also within
its immediate range.
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The exogenous variation in admission status can, apart from being used
to ﬁnd causal eﬀects of enrollment constraints on educational attainment
and labor market performance, also be used to estimate the eﬀect of edu-
cation on earnings. The sharp regression-discontinuity design exploits the
fact that admission status among eligible applicants is deterministic given
the admission selection variables. The relation between admission status
and educational attainment does not typically have this characteristic.10
However, if the regressor of interest is partly determined by a discontinu-
ous function of observed covariates, the eﬀect can be identiﬁed using a
fuzzy regression-discontinuity design. Admission status is, thus, a valid
instrument for education, given smooth functions of the admission selec-
tion variables (van der Klauuw, 1997; Hahn et al., 2001).
As a benchmark, the return to education is estimated using diﬀerent
comparison groups and diﬀerent sets of control variables. This follows the
same plan as above, and can be viewed as a mixed selection-on-observables
and selection-on-unobservables approach. Diﬀerent comparison groups
and information on performance indicators and educational preferences
can probably help to reduce the potential bias in the education estimates,
even without using instrumental variables. The relation between earnings
and years of education for the ith individual at time t,i sg i v e nb y :
Wit = Xiτ + Miϕ + Ziπ + Sitλ + νit,( 5 )
where Wit is earnings and Sit is years of education. Non-applicants, non-
eligibles and screen-outs will be used as comparison groups for admitted
applicants. The model is denoted OLS if it conditions on the demographic
characteristics, Xi, FE if it also controls for alternative-quota groups, Mi,
and FE-RD if it also conditions on the admission selection variables, Zi.
The instrumental variable model uses admission status as an instru-
ment for education, given both the alternative-quota groups and the ad-
mission selection variables. Only screen-outs are used as a comparison
group. Since the instrument is dichotomous the IV estimator can be
expressed as the ratio between the reduced form estimates of admission
status on earnings and of admission status on years of education:
λIV =
E [Wit | Xi,M i,Z i,D i =1 ]− E [Wit | Xi,M i,Z i,D i =0 ]
E [Sit | Xi,M i,Z i,D i =1 ]− E [Sit | Xi,M i,Z i,D i =0 ]
.( 6 )
10This would be the case only if all admitted applicants receive treatment, while none
of the screen-outs do. In reality, admitted a p p l i c a n t sc a nc h o o s et od r o po u tf r o ma
program, while screen-outs can substitute something else for it.
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by admission status to the diﬀerence in years of education by admission
status. Under the common treatment eﬀect assumption this estimator
identiﬁes the eﬀect of education on earnings.
The instrumental variable estimator can be given a causal interpreta-
tion also in a world of heterogeneous response to treatment. Imbens and
Angrist (1994) have developed an estimator known as the local average
treatment eﬀect (LATE). The crucial assumption is that no individual
counteract his or her assignment. In this case it means that screen-outs
that attend university would have done so also if they had been admitted
in the fall of 1982 (monotonicity). The Wald estimator (6) can then be
interpreted as the treatment eﬀect for those who change treatment status
as a response to the instrument (compliers).
The main analysis is based on the entire sample of eligible applicants.
However, if the model speciﬁcation does not entirely account for all the
direct eﬀects of the admission selection variables on the earnings, the es-
timated eﬀect of education on earnings might be biased. As a stability
check, the model is therefore estimated for individuals with diﬀerent abso-
lute distance from the threshold value. The functional form assumptions
have less importance the smaller the variation in the admission selection
variables is. In the end, only those with equal formal merits, but who diﬀer
in educational preferences and in the randomization, are being studied.11
4 The data and descriptive statistics
The data has been collected from administrative records kept by the
Swedish National Archives (Riksarkivet) and Statistics Sweden (Statistiska
centralbyrån), and include information on educational and labor market
characteristics over the 1981-96 period. It covers all 62,265 applicants for
undergraduate programs with central admission at the NSBUC in the fall
of 1982, and a sample of 12,416 non-applicants at the same point of time.
The non-applicants are stratiﬁed with respect to seven age classes and
three educational classes to ﬁt the structure of the applicants.12
11This approach diﬀers from reducing the sample with a ﬁxed share of the most
”extreme observations” for admitted and non-admitted applicants. Identiﬁcation in the
RD design is typically attainable for those close to the threshold only. Eliminating a
ﬁxed share of the sample would not reveal if there actually are any individuals around
the break-point. Also, it would keep any unbalances in the sample sizes of admitted
and non-admitted applicants.
12For a more detailed description of the data see Öckert (2001).
14 IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings?The NSBUC data covers the last round of the central admission pro-
cess, i.e. when applicants compete for at the most two educational altern-
atives. There is information on educational background, eligibility status,
the programs that the applicants have applied for, which quota groups
they have been placed in, their entry credits, their position on the waiting
list, etc. It does not include any data from the local admission at the uni-
versities. However, the Register of Universities and University Colleges at
Statistics Sweden has detailed information on enrollment and graduation
from all undergraduate courses and programs in Sweden in the period
1977-96.13 Thus, by matching the two sources together, it is possible to
track down the individuals on the waiting list that have enrolled to a par-
ticular alternative in the fall of 1982. Since the place oﬀers were given to
the applicants on the waiting list in order of priority, all applicants above
the last enrolled applicant are treated as being admitted.
All individuals have been merged with a number of other registers from
Statistics Sweden. The Register of the Population’s Education includes
completed education at all levels. Information on earnings and transfers
for the period 1981-96 is derived from the Register of Income, Taxes and
Allowances. It combines information from the tax assessment and state-
ments of income and allowances. It also includes data on gender, age,
residence, marital status and ethnicity. Information on the parents’ edu-
cation has been obtained by linking the individuals to the households in
which they were living according to the 1960 and 1965 censuses.14 About
8 per cent of the individuals in the sample lack information on family
background.
The years of education variable is derived from a number of adminis-
trative records. The data include complete education at all educational
levels, which has been converted to eﬀective years of education (based on
expected time of completion). Time spent in school or university that do
not lead to a formal degree is not registered.15 The earnings are deﬁned
as the sum of gross wage earnings and compensation during temporary
13There is also information on graduate school enrollment and graduation.
14This must not be their biological parents.
15Less than 80 per cent of the program entrants in the academic year of 1987/88
received a degree within eleven years. The corresponding ﬁgure for those who enrolled
to a separate course is less than 30 per cent (Statistics Sweden, 1999). To account for
incomplete university education, I have constructed an alternative measure on years
of education based on proxy variables (registrations and student grants) for university
studies. The least squares estimates on the return to education then becomes somewhat
lower and more sensitive to the choice of model speciﬁcation, while the IV-estimates are
about the same. The results are available from the author on request.
IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings? 15work absence (basically due to illness or parental leave) in 1996 SEK.16
No earnings restrictions are imposed. Both years of education and earn-
ings are observed in the 1981-96 period, which makes it possible to analyze
the dynamics of university enrollment constraints. Since there is informa-
tion from the pre-application period (1981), any diﬀerences in unobserved
outcome potential between the study and the comparison groups can be
tested for.
The primary regressor is a dummy variable indicating admission status
in the fall of 1982 (for programs with central admission at the NSBUC).
Diﬀerent sets of control variables are used in diﬀerent model speciﬁcations.
The OLS model controls for a number of demographic characteristics: year
of birth, a dummy variable for being a woman, seven dummy variables for
the father’s highest educational level and seven dummy variables for the
mother’s highest educational level. The FE model also includes dummy
variables for all combinations of alternatives and admission quota groups.
The FE-RE model also controls for entry credits in the nine admission
quota groups as well as the applicants’ ranking of the alternative (an
integer ranging between one and twelve).
As discussed in the econometric section, most empirical models require
the number of applicants to exceed the number of places available. To
make the results comparable between diﬀerent model speciﬁcations, this
restriction is set for the entire analysis. In the fall of 1982, there were on
average 3.5 eligible applicants per study place. However, the distribution
of applicants was skewed and the competition to some alternatives-quota
groups low. In particular, there were few applicants in the admission
quota groups for foreign students. Eliminating alternative-quota groups
with fewer applicants than places reduces the number of alternative-quota
groups with about one third, from 3,425 to 2,298. Still, all admission
quota groups and almost all alternatives are represented in the sample.
Applicants compete for at the most two alternatives in up to ﬁve dif-
f e r e n tq u o t ag r o u p s .T of a c i l i t a t et he analysis, individuals have been du-
plicated the number of times they appear in diﬀerent alternatives and ad-
mission quota groups. This means that the same individual can generate
several observations and that every observation refers to one alternative
and one admission quota group only. In this way the number of observa-
tions increases to 147,115.17
16The average USD/SEK exchange rate in 1996 was 6.70.
17The standard errors are adjusted for clustering (Moulton, 1986) in the analysis.
16 IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings?4.1 Years of education and earnings proﬁles
Weighted means and standard deviations for the demographic character-
istics and the admission selection variables are reported in Table A1 in
the Appendix. The typical person is born in the late 1950s or in the early
1960s. Roughly half the sample is females. Applicants are more likely
than non-applicants to have a parent with at least a university degree.
Also, admitted applicants have in general better family background than
non-eligibles or screen-outs. As expected, the entry credits for admit-
ted applicants are much higher than for screen-outs (almost two standard
deviations).
Table A2 in Appendix and Figure 1 report years of education between
1981 and 1996. All groups experience a rapid increase in educational
attainment the ﬁrst seven or eight years of the panel.






























Notes: Non-admitted applicants are weighted by the relative number of admitted to 
non-admitted applicants. Admitted applicants are left unweighted. 
IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings? 17In the 1990s, the growth in years of education is low and relatively
stable. Admitted applicants spend more time in school or university than
any other group. They are followed, in turn, by screen-outs, non-eligibles
and non-applicants. Even though the non-eligibles did not fulﬁll the en-
trance requirements in the fall of 1982, they have longer education than
non-applicants throughout the period. In 1996, there are big diﬀerences
between the groups. Non-applicants have 12.3 years of education, non-
eligibles have 12.8 years, screen-outs have 13.6 and admitted applicants
have 14.3 years of education. Hence, enrollment constraints in combina-
tion with self-selection and admission selection to university in 1982 have
generated substantial diﬀerences in educational attainment between the
groups.
What about labor market performance? Average real earnings proﬁles
for diﬀerent groups of application are shown in Table A3 in Appendix and
in Figure 2.



















Notes: Non-admitted applicants are weighted by the relative number of admitted to 
non-admitted applicants. Admitted applicants are left unweighted. All numbers are 
in 1996 SEK. 
18 IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings?Non-applicants clearly diﬀer from other groups, not only in their ini-
tial earnings level, but also in how their earnings evolve over time. They
are better oﬀ than other groups up to year 1988. From about 1990 their
proﬁle coincide with the one for non-eligibles. The earnings pattern for
admitted applicants and screen-outs looks much like a text book illustra-
tion of the eﬀects of human capital investments. However, there are some
exceptions. First, the decline in earnings during the university studies is
much smaller than what one might expect. This might be due to (1) a high
share of dropouts among the admitted applicants, (2) a large share of uni-
versity enrollment among the screen-outs and (3) students working while
studying. Second, the earnings diﬀerence in subsequent years is perhaps
somewhat smaller than the conventional picture. Note that all groups are
aﬀected by the recession in the early nineties, in particular non-applicants
and non-eligibles.
4.2 Graphical analysis
The deﬁning characteristic of the regression-discontinuity design is that
the probability of treatment is a discontinuous function of observed un-
derlying (selection) variables. If it is assumed that the outcome of interest
evolves smoothly with respect to the selection variables (or at least does
not ’jump’ when the probability of treatment does), the discontinuities in
the probability of treatment can be used as a source of exogenous variation.
To give some intuition about the empirical strategy, this section presents
some graphs of the relation between the admission selection variables and
diﬀerent outcomes.
To identify the eﬀect of enrollment constraints on education and earn-
ings, the probability of admission in 1982 must change at the threshold
value of the entry credits. Figure 3 reports the share of eligible applicants
who gained admission in 1982 by their deviation from the breakpoint.18
The relation between the entry credits and admission status is determin-
istic with one exception: some individuals at the breakpoint have not been
admitted. This is due to applicants with equal merits having been sep-
arated by their ranking of the alternative or by the drawing of lots. The
discontinuity in the probability of admission (along with the randomness
around the breakpoint in some cases) implies that individuals diﬀer in ad-
mission status even though they have (close to) identical formal merits. It
18Since the entry credits in the admission quota groups consist of diﬀerent compon-
ents, an encompassing measure, ranging between 1.0 and 5.0, has been constructed for
this graph.
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Figure 3 Admission status 1982 and deviation from the breakpoint
Notes: Admitted applicants are compared to screen-outs. Screen-outs are weighted 
by the relative number of admitted applicants to screened out applicants. Admitted 
applicants are left unweighted. 
If years of education changes discontinuously at the breakpoint of the
entry credits, admission status in 1982 is a valid instrument for education.
Figure 4 shows the mean years of education in 1996 at diﬀerent deviations
from the breakpoint.19 Clearly, the entry credits are positively related to
the years of education. A one unit increase in the entry credits corresponds
to an increase in education of about half a year. There is a clear discon-
tinuity in years of education at the threshold value, with an increase in
education of almost 0.3 years. Since the relation between the entry credits
and the years of education is smooth (and close of being linear) at all other
points, the sharp increase at the threshold value could only be explained
by the enrollment constraints in 1982. Hence, individuals with equal entry
19Since all combinations of alternatives and admission quota groups have a threshold
value of their own and because the entry credits consists of diﬀerent components in
diﬀerent admission quota groups, I use the residual from a regression of years of educa-
tion or earnings on demographic characteristics and alternatvie-quota groups in Figure
4a n dF i g u r e5 .
20 IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings?credits (and on average equal unobserved characteristics) diﬀer in years of
education due to luck (or bad luck) in the admission selection to university
15 years earlier. This variation is not a result of self-selection or admission
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Figure 4 Years of education 1996 and deviation from the breakpoint
Notes: The residual is obtained from a weighted regression of years of education in 
1996 on gender, year of birth, parental education, fixed effects for all combinations 
of alternatives and quota groups, admission status in 1982, entry credits and the 
applicants’ ranking of the alternative. The coefficients and values for admission 
status in 1982 and the entry credits have been added back to the residual. Admitted 
applicants are compared to screen-outs. Screen-outs are weighted by the relative 
number of admitted applicants to screened out applicants. Admitted applicants are 
left unweighted. 
What is the relation between the admission selection rules in 1982
and earnings? Figure 5 shows the average earnings in 1996 for diﬀerent
distance from the breakpoint. There is a positive and almost linear relation
between the entry credits and earnings. However, there is no sharp change
at the breakpoint. Hence, the extra years of education arising from the
admission selection in 1982 have no parallel in earnings in 1996. To get
af u l lp i c t u r eo ft h ee ﬀects of enrollment constraints on education and
earnings and to estimate the return to education there is, however, need
for regression analysis.
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Figure 5 Earnings 1996 and deviation from the breakpoint
Notes: The residual is obtained from a weighted regression of earnings in 1996 on gender, 
year of birth, parental education, fixed effects for all combinations of alternatives and quota 
groups, admission status in 1982, entry credits and the applicants’ ranking of the 
alternative. The coefficients and values for admission status in 1982 and the entry credits 
have been added back to the residual. Admitted applicants are compared to screen-outs. 
Screen-outs are weighted by the relative number of admitted applicants to screened out 
applicants. Admitted applicants are left unweighted. All numbers are in 1996 SEK 
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Years of education
For university enrollment constraints to be eﬀective, they should restrict
admission to university for a cohort of applicants - not only at a given point
of time - but also in the long run. It is, however, possible that enrollment
constraints only lead to delayed enrollment and do not aﬀect the amount
of university education obtained. This is because non-admitted applicants
may be admitted later on. Also, admitted applicants may choose to drop
out.
T a b l e1a n dF i g u r e6r e p o r tt h ee ﬀect of enrollment constraints in 1982
on years of education 1981-96.
22 IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings?        Table 1 The effect of enrollment constraints on years of education 
                  
 Comparison  group 
         
   Non-applicants     Non-eligibles  Screen-outs 
Year  OLS  OLS FE OLS FE  FE-RD 
        
1981 0.181 0.622 0.000  -0.007  -0.008 0.017 
  (0.012) (0.025) (0.025) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) 
1982 0.352 0.563 0.061 0.042 0.010 0.041 
  (0.011) (0.022) (0.018) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) 
1983 0.573 0.731 0.277 0.204 0.185 0.166 
  (0.011) (0.021) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) 
1984 0.900 0.991 0.618 0.417 0.441 0.326 
  (0.011) (0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) 
1985 1.142 1.185 0.911 0.551 0.628 0.389 
  (0.013) (0.022) (0.027) (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) 
1986 1.389 1.389 1.152 0.642 0.769 0.425 
  (0.015) (0.023) (0.033) (0.014) (0.014) (0.021) 
1987 1.555 1.513 1.313 0.673 0.830 0.409 
  (0.016) (0.025) (0.037) (0.015) (0.016) (0.024) 
1988 1.653 1.577 1.403 0.671 0.840 0.377 
  (0.017) (0.026) (0.041) (0.016) (0.018) (0.026) 
1989 1.707 1.597 1.440 0.657 0.829 0.340 
  (0.018) (0.027) (0.045) (0.017) (0.018) (0.027) 
1990 1.739 1.605 1.453 0.648 0.820 0.316 
  (0.018) (0.028) (0.050) (0.018) (0.019) (0.028) 
1991 1.763 1.616 1.472 0.645 0.817 0.301 
  (0.019) (0.029) (0.052) (0.018) (0.020) (0.028) 
1992 1.782 1.622 1.491 0.641 0.814 0.292 
  (0.019) (0.029) (0.053) (0.018) (0.020) (0.029) 
1993 1.795 1.623 1.496 0.637 0.809 0.280 
  (0.019) (0.030) (0.055) (0.018) (0.020) (0.029) 
1994 1.805 1.625 1.500 0.633 0.805 0.271 
  (0.019) (0.030) (0.056) (0.019) (0.021) (0.030) 
1995 1.811 1.628 1.506 0.631 0.806 0.267 
  (0.020) (0.031) (0.057) (0.019) (0.021) (0.030) 
1996 1.816 1.632 1.518 0.631 0.807 0.265 
  (0.020) (0.031) (0.057) (0.019) (0.021) (0.030) 
N 42,207  42,614  42,614  121,876  121,876  121,876 
Notes: Cluster-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. The OLS estimates include controls 
for gender, year of birth and parental education. The FE estimates also include fixed effects for 
all combinations of alternatives and quota groups. The FE-RD estimates also include entry 
credits for nine quota groups and the applicants’ ranking of the alternative. Non-admitted 
applicants are weighted by the relative number of admitted to non-admitted applicants. 
Admitted applicants are left unweighted. 
 
IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings? 23In the ﬁrst column, admitted applicants are compared to non-applicants
using the OLS speciﬁcation. Beginning in 1982, admitted applicants ex-
perience quite a rapid growth in years of education. The positive trend
levels out in the 1990s. In the end of the panel, the university enroll-
ment constraint eﬀect is estimated at roughly 1.8 years of education. In
the second column of Table 1, admitted applicants are compared to non-
eligibles. The growth in years of education is somewhat lower in the 1980s
when using this comparison group. In the third column of Table 1 the
alternative-quota ﬁxed eﬀects are added, which leads to somewhat lower
estimates.20 The overall picture does, however, not change. In 1996, the
eﬀect of university enrollment constraints is estimated to be about 1.6
years of education.
Screen-outs are used as comparison group for admitted applicants in
the fourth column of Table 1. The eﬀect of enrollment constraints on
educational attainment is much more moderate when using screen-outs as
comparison group. Further, the screen-outs seem to compensate for the
failure in the admission selection in 1982 rather quickly. The diﬀerence
between the groups peaks in 1987. It then ﬂattens out and stays around
0.6 years in all of the 1990s. In the ﬁfth column of Table 1, the ﬁxed
eﬀects are added which produces somewhat higher estimates.
Admission selection has not so far been considered in the analysis. The
last column of Table 1 reports RD-FE estimates using screen-outs as com-
parison group for admitted applicants. The admission selection variables
enter linearly in the model.21 All estimates drop radically when adding
the admission selection variables. Hence, much of the estimated eﬀects
in the previous speciﬁcations were due to diﬀerences in admission selec-
tion. The eﬀect of university enrollment constraints on years of education
settles around 0.27 years in the 1990s.
Years of education is an encompassing measure of educational attain-
ment. To get a feeling for where the eﬀect sets in, I have used alternative
measures. First, I have estimated the eﬀects of university enrollment con-
straints on the probability of attaining diﬀerent educational levels in 1996.
The results show that the admission in 1982 basically moves individuals
from long high school (and to some extent from short university education)
20The pre-application diﬀerence in years of education vanishes when adding the ﬁxed
eﬀects. This is because the admission quota groups are deﬁned by educational back-
ground, and adding them as controls is analogous to conditioning on pre-application
years of education.
21I have re-estimated the models with higher moments and interactions between ad-
mission status and the selection variables. Some of the moments and interactions emerge
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, but the estimated eﬀects do not change much.



























Non-applicants, OLS Screen-outs, OLS
Non-eligibles, OLS Screen-outs, FE
Non-eligibles, FE Screen-outs, FE-RD
Figure 6 The effect of enrollment constraints on years of education
Notes: The OLS estimates include controls for gender, year of birth and parental 
education. The FE estimates also include fixed effects for all combinations of 
alternatives and quota groups. The FE-RD estimates also include entry credits for 
nine quota groups and the applicants’ ranking of the alternative. Non-admitted 
applicants are weighted by the relative number of admitted to non-admitted 
applicants. Admitted applicants are left unweighted. 
Second, I have estimated the probability of university enrollment at
any time between 1977 and 1996. Admitted applicants in 1982 have about
7 per cent higher probability of university enrollment than screen-outs.
Also the timing diﬀers. Admitted applicants enroll to university on av-
erage two thirds of a year earlier than do the screen-outs (conditional
on having enrolled). Third, the years of education eﬀect has been decom-
posed into the eﬀect arising from higher probability of attending university
(participation eﬀect) and the eﬀect arising from longer university studies
among those who enroll (dose eﬀect).22 Roughly 90 per cent of the eﬀect is
22The years of education eﬀect is given by E [Sit | Di =1 ]− E [Sit | Di =0 ]
= E [Sit | Rit =1 ,D i =0 ]{P [Rit =1| Di =1 ]− P [Rit =1| Di =0 ] }
+P [Rit =1| Di =1 ]{E [Sit | Rit =1 ,D i =1 ]− E [Sit | Rit =1 ,D i =0 ] },
IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings? 25due to higher probability of university enrollment for admitted applicants
w h i l eo n l y1 0p e rc e n to ft h ee ﬀect is due to longer education among those
who enroll.
To sum up, the choice of comparison group as well as the empirical
speciﬁcation is crucial in ﬁnding causal eﬀects of enrollment constraints.
When admitted applicants are compared to non-applicants, the university
enrollment eﬀect in 1996 is estimated to be more than 1.8 years of edu-
cation. The corresponding ﬁgure, when using screen-outs as comparison
group and controlling for both alternative-quota group ﬁxed eﬀects and
the admission selection variables, is 0.27 years of education. Hence, only
15 per cent of the gross diﬀerence is due to the enrollment constraints.
The university enrollment constraints in 1982 aﬀect educational at-
tainment even 15 years later. The eﬀect is more pronounced in the years
following the admission selection. Other groups ﬁnd their way to univer-
sity in subsequent years, making the overall diﬀerence smaller. However,
they never catch up. So, enrollment constraints are eﬀective in shutting
individuals out from the universities also in the long run. However, the
eﬀect is not so big. The years of education eﬀects also seem to be rather
stable in the last seven or eight years of the panel.
5.2 Earnings
University enrollment constraints at a given point of time might aﬀect
earnings for a number of reasons. First, the constraints aﬀect the timing
of university studies. The study group members gain admission earlier
than those in the comparison groups. Even though students quite often
work while studying, the number of hours worked as well as the wage is
probably low. It is, thus, reasonable to expect a negative earnings ef-
fect of enrollment constraints for a period following the year of admission.
Since most comparison group members enter university later, their earn-
ings probably will dip later on. Second, the enrollment constraints aﬀect
the amount of university education obtained. Thus, the earnings dip for
the study group probably is larger than the later dip for the comparison
groups. Third, a higher share of the study group receive the potential
returns to university education.
Table 2 and Figure 7 present the eﬀect of enrollment constraints on
earnings.
where Rit is university registration and Sit is years of university education. The years
of education conditional on registration, E [Sit | Rit =1 ], is E [Sit]/P [Rit =1 ] .
26 IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings?                 Table 2 The effect of enrollment constraints on earnings 
                    
 Comparison  group 
         
     Non-applicants       Non-eligibles               Screen-outs 
Year  OLS  OLS FE  OLS FE  FE-RD 
        
1981  -13865.9   5850.2  5340.4  7309.7     16558.9  643.8    
 (649.5)  (910.8) (1551.8) (461.3) (492.8) (653.6) 
1982  -28179.1 -7597.1  -11263.7 -6696.8  -676.6 -9953.2 
 (642.1)  (898.1) (1628.4) (445.2) (530.9) (706.5) 
1983  -51518.1 -29858.0 -32833.4 -23931.8 -22112.0 -21377.6 
 (652.5)  (951.3) (1762.8) (470.8) (590.7) (792.5) 
1984  -54743.6 -28751.9 -34842.0 -19281.3 -20121.2 -15818.1 
 (711.0)  (1031.0) (1904.1) (529.7) (661.4) (865.2) 
1985 -40883.7  -17049.6  -24100.7  -7645.8  -9694.6  -4240.1 
 (730.4)  (1103.4) (2311.2) (562.1) (708.3) (943.4) 
1986 -25726.6  -2923.5  -7208.8  2874.6  2017.3  3799.4 
 (788.3)  (1193.5) (2620.0) (622.6) (787.7) (1047.7) 
1987  -10893.2 9179.0 4932.3 9837.5  11371.8 8579.8 
 (822.0)  (1240.3) (2707.9) (678.3) (822.9) (1136.5) 
1988  261.2 17884.6 11941.7 13450.4 16414.9 10730.3 
 (850.8)  (1294.6) (2889.4) (704.5) (881.2) (1212.5) 
1989 7299.8 22630.6 17604.8 12804.5 16334.1  7831.9 
 (905.7)  (1368.8) (3094.6) (752.5) (934.5) (1284.2) 
1990  14844.2 28608.7 23791.7 12433.5 17141.0  6076.3 
 (954.8)  (1459.8) (3411.2) (799.1) (985.1) (1368.2) 
1991  18109.2 31619.3 27578.5 12178.7 17813.1  4895.6 
 (1120.0)  (1573.9) (3652.1) (891.8) (1089.7) (1460.9) 
1992  21074.1 34262.3 34814.3 12188.9 18092.5  2649.2 
 (1105.3)  (1669.6) (3487.8) (909.7) (1125.8) (1528.8) 
1993  24238.6 35862.5 33111.0 12177.0 18635.3  1720.1 
 (1221.6)  (1761.7) (3934.1) (1067.1) (1249.9) (1812.7) 
1994  26926.4 38282.3 42693.3 12250.6 20319.8  852.9 
 (1405.1)  (2217.6) (3950.6) (1306.5) (1491.3) (2143.5) 
1995  28926.7 41452.1 43032.5 13717.8 21460.2  458.8 
 (1354.4)  (1958.5) (4065.2) (1218.9) (1403.8) (1877.8) 
1996  32718.8 46615.5 49050.7 15554.1 23781.9  -853.9 
  (1453.6) (2036.1) (4193.2) (1361.8) (1640.7) (2306.7) 
N  42,207 42,614 42,614  121,876  121,876  121,876 
Notes: Cluster-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. The OLS estimates include controls 
for gender, year of birth and parental education. The FE estimates also include fixed effects for all 
combinations of alternatives and quota groups. The FE-RD estimates also include entry credits 
for nine quota groups and the applicants’ ranking of the alternative. Non-admitted applicants are 
weighted by the number of admitted to non-admitted applicants. Admitted applicants are left 
unweighted. All numbers are in 1996 SEK. 
 
IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings? 27The ﬁrst column of Table 2 reports the OLS estimates when using non-
applicants as the comparison group. Admitted applicants have signiﬁc-
antly lower earnings than non-applicants in the pre-application year. This
is somewhat surprising, but could in part be due to a higher share of ad-
mitted applicants than non-applicants being in school at the time (60 per
cent to 45 per cent, respectively). The earnings for admitted applicants
drop radically in comparison to the ones for non-applicants in the two
years following the year of admission to university. In 1984 the earnings
diﬀerence is almost -55,000 SEK. The negative earnings eﬀects diminish in
the subsequent years and vanish by 1988. The remaining period is charac-
terized by a steady earnings growth for admitted applicants in comparison
to non-applicants. In 1996, admitted applicants earn on average 30,000
SEK more than non-applicants. This corresponds to about 18 per cent of
the average earnings of the non-applicants.
The second column of Table 2 presents the eﬀects of enrollment con-
straints on earnings when comparing admitted applicants to non-eligibles.
Admitted applicants seem to be better oﬀ even without receiving any
treatment. In 1981 they earn almost 6,000 SEK more than non-eligibles.
Diﬀerences in university enrollments generate negative earnings eﬀects in
the 1982-86 period. The earnings loss is about 30,000 at the most, which
is less than when using non-applicants as comparison group. From 1987
and onwards, admitted applicants get ahead. The university enrollment
constraint earnings eﬀect is roughly 46,000 SEK in 1996, or 26 per cent
of the average earnings for non-eligibles, which is much higher than when
using non-applicants as comparison group. Adding the alternative-quota
ﬁxed eﬀects does not change the result much.
The earnings of admitted applicants are compared to those of screen-
outs in the three last columns of Table 4. In the OLS model, admit-
ted applicants have higher earnings than the screen-outs even in the pre-
application year. The earnings penalty from attending university is lower
when using screen-outs as the comparison group than when using the other
groups. Also, the period with positive earnings starts earlier. In the 1988-
96 period, the earnings eﬀects lie rather stable around 13,000 SEK. This
corresponds to about 6.5 per cent of the average earnings for screen-outs.
Adding the ﬁxed eﬀects to the model generates somewhat higher earnings
eﬀects for most of the period.
The last column of Table 4 reports the estimates from the FE-RD
model. Most admitted applicants and screen-outs are in school in 1981.
Earnings diﬀerences in the pre-application period may therefore not be
very informative about unobserved outcome potential. Nevertheless, the
28 IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings?groups should not diﬀer in this respect. Indeed, the ﬁrst row of column
six shows that the earnings of admitted applicants and screen-outs do
not signiﬁcantly diﬀer in 1981. The admission to university leads to an
earnings dip for admitted applicants in the 1982-85 period. The earnings
eﬀect is then almost 11,000 SEK. They then get ahead up to year 1988. In
the subsequent years the earnings diﬀerences diminish, to be completely
eliminated in 1996. Hence, there are no long term eﬀects of university
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Figure 7 The effect of enrollment constraints on earnings
Notes: The OLS estimates include controls for gender, year of birth and parental 
education. The FE estimates also include fixed effects for all combinations of 
alternatives and quota groups. The FE-RD estimates also include entry credits for 
nine quota groups and the applicants’ ranking of the alternative. Non-admitted 
applicants are weighted by the relative number of admitted to non-admitted 
applicants. Admitted applicants are left unweighted. All numbers are in 1996 SEK. 
Why do the earnings eﬀects vanish in the 1990s? The university en-
rollment constraints in 1982 aﬀect both the amount and the timing of
university education. Figure 8 depicts the eﬀects of university enrollment
constraints on earnings and university enrollment rates.












































Earnings effect Enrollment rate effect
Figure 8 The effect of enrollment constraints on earnings and enrollment
Notes: The enrollment rate effects are estimated using a linear probability model. 
Admitted applicants are compared to screen-outs. The empirical specification 
includes controls for gender, year of birth, parental education, fixed effects for all 
combinations of alternatives and quota groups, entry credits for nine quota groups 
and the applicants’ ranking of the alternative. Non-admitted applicants are weighted 
by the relative number of admitted to non-admitted applicants. Admitted applicants 
are left unweighted. 
Clearly, the earnings pattern is negatively related to university enroll-
ments. The earnings dip in the beginning of the period corresponds to
an increase in the university enrollment rates. By the same token, the
positive earnings eﬀects in the late 1980s took place when a higher share
of the comparison group members attended university. The diﬀerences
in enrollment rates, however, seem to be associated with higher earnings
diﬀerences in the late 1980s than in the early 1980s. This is to be expec-
ted since the value of forgone earnings increases with time, both due to
experience and to education. The observed earnings and enrollment rate
eﬀect pattern is, thus, consistent with a scenario where forgone earnings
while studying is the only monetary eﬀect of university education.23 To
23I have also estimated the eﬀects of university enrollment constraints on childbearing,
30 IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings?sum up, even though the university enrollment constraints in 1982 aﬀect
educational attainment also in the long run, they are not associated with
higher earnings. As expected, the admitted applicants fare worse on the
labor market in the years following the admission. From 1986 they get
ahead, but only for a couple of years. The biggest earnings eﬀect is found
in 1988. Thereafter the eﬀect peters out. The earnings pattern is found
to be a mirror image of the university enrollment rates. The dip and peak
in the earnings pattern corresponds to a peak and a dip in the enrollment
rates. One interpretation of the observed pattern is that the earnings ef-
fects vary around zero, driven by diﬀerences in university enrollment rates.
5.3 Return to education
University enrollment constraints aﬀect both educational attainment and
earnings in 1981-96. This section tries to relate the diﬀerences in years
of education to the diﬀerences in earnings. First, the return to education
is estimated using diﬀerent comparison groups and adding more controls
to the model. This is analogous to the approach in the previous sections.
Second, discontinuities in the admission selection to university are used as
an instrument for years of education.
Using a cohort of applicants (and non-applicants) makes it possible to
study the dynamics of the returns to education. On the other hand, there
is need for a long follow-up period. Even though the year of application
is dated back to the early eighties, roughly 5 per cent of the sample is
registered at a university course or program in 1996. Also, the earnings
of the ﬁrst years in the labor market might not be a very good measure
on the long-run eﬀects of university education. To avoid some of these
problems, I will study the eﬀect of education on earnings for the 1990s
only.
Table 3 reports least squares estimates of the return to education using
diﬀerent comparison groups and model speciﬁcations. It reveals a number
of interesting ﬁndings. First, the rate of return increases steadily over
time. The reason for this pattern is probably not a rapid growth in the
rate of return to education in general, but rather a reduction of the share
of students in the sample and low initial earnings. This illustrates the
problem of using a cohort of applicants to estimate the return to educa-
tion. Second, the sample studied matters.24 The return to education for
unemployment and migration/mortality. However, the eﬀects are very small (and in
most cases not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero), and do not contribute to explaining
the observed earnings pattern.
24The distinction between study and comparison groups is less clear in this part of
IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings? 31the pooled sample of admitted applicants and non-applicants is estimated
at about 12,700 SEK in 1996. This corresponds to about 7 per cent of
the average earnings for non-applicants.25 The corresponding ﬁgure when
studying admitted applicants and screen-outs is about 11,300 SEK. The
diﬀerence between the estimates is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
         Table 3 Least squares estimates of the education earnings premium 
                    
 Comparison  group 
         
  Non-applicants     Non-eligibles               Screen-outs 
Year  OLS  OLS FE OLS FE  FE-RD 
        
1990  7436.4 8460.5 8071.5 6618.4 6732.0 5932.2 
  (234.1) (274.0) (790.6) (229.4) (275.6) (283.5) 
1991  8163.3 9264.8 8835.5 7460.3 6888.2 6028.4 
  (266.7) (301.0) (792.7) (243.8) (293.3) (301.7) 
1992  8931.5 9894.0 9621.8 8239.3 7346.5 6461.7 
  (261.5) (315.7) (757.5) (249.8) (301.2) (307.9) 
1993  9308.4  10097.4 9740.2 8633.5 7683.1 6758.2 
  (277.7) (333.2) (848.6) (268.7) (332.9) (344.0) 
1994 10087.9  10763.2  10686.5  9445.6  7848.0  6780.6 
  (344.1) (433.6) (910.7) (340.6) (399.0) (409.4) 
1995  11113.5 11782.5 11344.5 10053.1  8503.0  7382.1 
  (318.4) (394.7) (943.3) (310.4) (365.5) (372.0) 
1996  12688.1 13690.6 13427.1 11300.8  9484.5  8227.8 
  (337.8) (376.2) (944.1) (349.9) (434.2) (440.5) 
N 42,207 42,614 42,614  121,876  121,876  121,876 
 
Notes: Cluster-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. The OLS estimates include controls 
for gender, year of birth and parental education. The FE estimates also include fixed effects for all 
combinations of alternatives and quota groups. The FE-RD estimates also include entry credits 
for nine quota groups and the applicants’ ranking of the alternative. Non-admitted applicants are 
weighted by the relative number of admitted to non-admitted applicants. Admitted applicants are 
left unweighted. 
 
Third, much of the estimated returns to education can be explained
the analysis. As before, admitted applicants are pooled with diﬀerent samples of non-
admitted individuals. However, the focus of the analysis is not the diﬀerences between
the study and the comparison groups, but instead the diﬀerences between groups with
diﬀerent amount of education.
25The return to education in Sweden is typically estimated at between four and ﬁve per
cent, see Arai and Kjellstrom (1999) for a survey. The higher (gross) return to education
in this study might be due to the fact that it (1) includes all workers, non-wage earners
as well as wage earners, (2) uses a non-representative sample of the Swedish population,
and (3) measures the return to eﬀective (rather than to actual) years of education.
32 IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings?by observed characteristics from the admission selection process. In all,
roughly 35 per cent of the estimated earnings eﬀects is eliminated when
pooling admitted applicants with screen-outs instead of non-applicants
and when adding information from the admission selection process to the
m o d e l . T h eb e s te s t i m a t eu s i n gl e a s ts q u a r e ss u g g e s t st h a tt h er e t u r n
to education is roughly 8,000 SEK in 1996. This corresponds to about 4
per cent of the average earnings for screen-outs. Controlling for observed
variables from the admission selection process will probably not free the
estimates from endogeniety bias. However, the discontinuity in the ad-
mission rules can be used as a source of exogenous variation in education.
The Wald estimator using admission status as an instrument is simply
the ratio between the eﬀect of enrollment constraints on earnings to their
eﬀect on years of education.
Table 4 reports IV estimates using admission status as the instru-
ment and controlling for alternative-quota groups and admission selection
variables. In column one, the entire sample is used. Unfortunately, all
estimates are rather imprecise. There is, nevertheless, a substantial eﬀect
of education on earnings in 1990: more than 19,000 SEK. However, the
IV estimates drops radically over the period. Since the eﬀect of the in-
strument on educational attainment is rather stable in the 1990s, this is
mainly due to the eﬀect of the instrument on earnings. In 1993-96 the re-
turn is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The point estimate is actually
negative in 1996.
The fuzzy regression discontinuity design identiﬁes the eﬀect around
the breakpoint. Smooth functions of the selection variables can be used to
extrapolate the eﬀect above and below the threshold. To check the eﬀect
of these functional form assumptions, the remaining columns of Table 4
present the eﬀect of education on earnings when restricting the sample
with diﬀerent absolute deviations in entry credits from the breakpoint. In
the last column only those with equal entry credits are studied. Unfortu-
nately, the precision in the estimates is low, why they do not signiﬁcantly
diﬀer from each other. If anything, the functional form assumptions seem
to underestimate the true earnings eﬀect of education.
Could the low returns to education be due to diﬀerences in labor sup-
ply? Table 5 reports the return to education for those earning more than
100,000 SEK at diﬀerent points in time. The estimates are much lower
with than without the earnings restriction. This is to be expected since
years of education probably have a positive eﬀect on both employment
and hours worked. Still, the estimates follow the same pattern as do the
unrestricted earnings premium.
IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings? 33Table 4  IV estimates of the education earnings premium. Restricting the 
sample with different absolute deviation in entry credits from the 
breakpoint. 
                
    Absolute deviation from the breakpoint: 
       
Year  All  Max 1.0  Max 0.5  Max 0.2  Max 0.0 
       
1990  19252.7 16630.1 14791.9 12344.4 14668.5 
  (4457.3) (4389.9) (5237.1) (6363.8)  (17294.4) 
1991  16267.7 14844.7 11955.2  9272.4  -12073.8 
  (4926.0) (4857.3) (5811.2) (6956.6)  (17633.9) 
1992  9080.0 7882.4 8186.0  11591.6  -11592.1 
  (5221.9) (5177.4) (6104.9) (7308.8)  (17686.3) 
1993  6149.1 6890.8 4349.5 7852.3  -5245.1 
  (6449.2) (6231.3) (7774.6) (8172.4)  (18394.1) 
1994 3151.2  2037.9 -3744.8 -4019.5  -32736.6 
  (7899.4) (7520.3) (9327.0)  (11837.7)  (30088.6) 
1995  1718.3 3176.8 -891.3 1471.6  -18593.1 
  (7015.3) (7003.3) (8554.7)  (10281.5)  (26438.3) 
1996 -3220.0  606.8  5917.5  -3239.8 -38085.2 
  (8736.2) (8815.3) (9731.7)  (12685.8)  (33973.3) 
N   121,876  90,124   52,057   24,106    4,022 
 
Notes: Cluster-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. The empirical specification 
includes controls for gender, year of birth, parental education, fixed effects for all 
combinations of alternatives and quota groups, entry credits for nine quota groups and 
the applicants’ ranking of the alternative. Admitted applicants are compared to screen-
outs. Screen-outs are weighted by the relative number of admitted applicants to screened 
out applicants. Admitted applicants are left unweighted. Alternative-quota groups without 
observations in both the study and the comparison group within the required range from 
the breakpoint have been eliminated. 
 
In 1996 the return to education, when pooling admitted applicants
with non-applicants in the OLS speciﬁcation, is estimated at 3.8 per cent.
If instead pooling admitted applicants with screen-outs, the estimated
return drops to 2.8 per cent. Adding the ﬁxed eﬀects to the model, leads to
radically lower returns. This is probably due to the ﬁxed eﬀects controlling
for lower levels of education, which have been found to have high returns
in the sample.26 Adding the admission selection variables to the model
26I have decomposed years of education into lower education (compulsory school and
high school) and higher education (undergraduate education and graduate education).
When pooling admitted applicants with screen-outs and using the OLS speciﬁcation,
the estimated returns to lower education is as high as 9.0 per cent, while the return to
34 IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings?reduces the estimate from 1.8 to 1.5 per cent in 1996.
Table 5  Least squares estimates of the education earnings premium, 
restricting earnings to be greater than 100,000 SEK. 
                  
 Comparison  group 
       
  Non-applicants                           Screen-outs 
Year OLS  OLS  FE  FE-RD  IV 
       
1990 0.026  0.021  0.015  0.011  0.051 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) 
1991 0.028  0.021  0.014  0.010  0.066 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.018) 
1992 0.028  0.023  0.015  0.011  0.060 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.019) 
1993 0.029  0.022  0.014  0.010  0.036 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.020) 
1994 0.031  0.025  0.016  0.012  0.028 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.021) 
1995 0.035  0.026  0.017  0.014  0.014 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.022) 
1996 0.038  0.028  0.018  0.015  0.004 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.024) 
 
Notes: Cluster-adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. The OLS estimates 
include controls for gender, year of birth and parental education. The FE 
estimates also include fixed effects for all combinations of alternatives and quota 
groups. The FE-RD estimates also include entry credits for nine quota groups and 
the applicants’ ranking of the alternative. Non-admitted applicants are weighted by 
the relative number of admitted to non-admitted applicants. Admitted applicants 
are left unweighted. 
 
The IV point estimate is less than 0.5 per cent, although not signi-
ﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero or the other estimates. However, since the
earnings restriction increases the precision in the estimates, it is possible
to rule out returns to education exceeding 1.7 per cent (using the FE-RD
speciﬁcation). Hence, the return to education is low in Sweden, both when
using least squares and instrumental variable techniques.
higher education is only 2.2 per cent. The high return to lower education is probably
due to the relatively small variation in years of lower education in the sample. Small
diﬀerences in years of education might therefore be associated with big diﬀerences in
unobserved outcome potential. Adding the ﬁxed eﬀects lead to a radical drop in the
estimated return to lower education to about 1.8 per cent, while the return to higher
education only drops to about 1.9 per cent.
IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings? 355.4 Caveat
Bound et al. (1995) discuss problems with using instruments that are
weakly correlated with the regressor of interest. Even weak correlations
between the instruments and the error term in the outcome equation can
then lead to inconsistency.27 The inconsistency goes in the same direction
as the correlation between the instruments and the error term. Bound et
al. (1995) propose the partial R2 of the excluded instruments as a rough
test for the quality of the instrumental variables. Table 6 presents the
partial R2 for the admission status dummy in the ﬁrst step equation of
years of education.28
Table 6 Partial R2 for the excluded instrument 
 
       









   
Notes: Test statistics for admission status in 1982 in the first-step 
equation of years of education on gender, year of birth, parental 
education, fixed effects for all combinations of alternatives and quota 
groups, entry credits for nine quota groups and the applicants’ ranking 
of the alternative. Admitted applicants are compared to screen-outs. 
Screen-outs are weighted by the relative number of admitted to 
screened out applicants. Admitted applicants are left unweighted.   
The partial R2 is relatively low, although substantially higher than
what has been reported in many other studies e.g. Angrist and Krueger
(1991).29 For the low IV-estimates to be due to inconsistency, the instru-
ment must be negatively correlated with the error term. In other words,
the discontinuities in the admission selection must have a direct negative
27Bound et al. (1995) also discuss the problem of ﬁnite sample bias. However, exactly
identiﬁed models (as this one) do not suﬀer from ﬁnite sample bias (Angrist and Krueger,
1999).
28The partial R





yx ,w h e r eR
2
yxz is R
2 when including the instru-
ment z,a n dR
2
yx is R
2 when excluding the instrument z.
29Despite the criticism of Bound et al. (1995), few studies report the Partial R
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36 IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings?eﬀect on earnings. To ﬁt the pattern of the IV-estimates, the negative
relation between the instrument and the earnings must also strengthen
over time. It is, however, not clear why such a relationship should exist.
I ft h er e s p o n s et ot r e a t m e n td i ﬀer between individuals the Wald es-
timator identiﬁes LATE (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). This is the mean
eﬀect of treatment for those who receive more university education due
to luck in the admission selection to university in 1982 (compliers). The
question is why some of the unsuccessful applicants end up in university
while others don’t. In a human capital framework, individuals would keep
on applying to university as long as the associated net expected bene-
ﬁts are higher than the costs. However, the admission to university took
place only twice a year, with most of the places being allocated in the
fall semester.30 Hence, unsuccessful applicants typically had to wait an-
other year until they could apply for admission again. As time goes by
the period left on the labor market (with potentially higher earnings) de-
creases, while the value of forgone earnings (due to the return to labor
market experience) increases. Also, the chance of receiving a lucky wage
oﬀer increases. All these factors make unsuccessful applicants less likely
to apply again.31 University enrollment constraints probably also aﬀect
the re-application behavior, both by discouraging unsuccessful applicants
to apply again and by reducing the chance of admission for those who ap-
ply. The group of compliers might, thus, consist of individuals who would
otherwise have applied to university again, but who would have failed to
gain admission due to the enrollment constraints. It might also consist
of individuals who would not have re-applied to university due to having
been discouraged to do so or due to having found a good job.
To check if the low return to education (at least partly) can be due to
a high share of unsuccessful applicants having found a good job, I have
estimated the eﬀect of lagged earnings (in 1982) on the probability to
enroll to university (in 1983) among screened out applicants. The eﬀect
of lagged earnings is small but positive, implying that individuals who
have found a good job (high lagged earnings) are more likely to apply
30About three quarters of the places available at the NSBUC for the 1982/83 academic
year were allocated in the fall semester. The corresponding ﬁgure for all places available
at Swedish universities was two thirds.
31The outside options might also change with time. There was a small recession in
Sweden in the early eighties, with rising unemployment (from 2 to about 3 per cent)
between 1980 and 1983. The labor market situation improved for the remaining part
of the 1980s. Thus, unsuccessful applicants (who might have applied to university for
labor market reasons) were probably more likely to get a job in the years after 1982
than before, which lowers the probability for them to apply again.
IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings? 37later. This indicates that the selection of students to university (lagged
earnings is a proxy for outcome potential) is of greater importance than
possible exogenous wage chocks. Hence, it is not likely that a high share
of compliers with lucky wage oﬀers is the main explanation for the very
low returns.
6 Conclusions
This paper estimates the impact of university enrollment constraints on
educational attainment and labor market performance, as well as the ef-
fect of education on earnings, in Sweden 1981-96. The years of education
is clearly aﬀected by the enrollment constraints. However, the eﬀect is
not so big as the raw diﬀerence between admitted applicants and a group
of non-applicants indicates (about 1.8 years of education in 1996). The
more the comparison group resembles the study group, the smaller is the
eﬀect of enrollment constraints on educational attainment. Adding con-
trols for alternative-quota groups and smooth functions of the admission
selection variables reduce the estimates further. My best estimate suggests
the eﬀect of university enrollment constraints to be about one quarter of
a year of education in 1996. Hence, most of the raw diﬀerence is driven
by diﬀerences in self-selection and admission selection to university. The
university enrollment constraints still have been successful in shutting in-
dividuals out from the universities, even though the long-run eﬀect is not
very big.
The eﬀect of university enrollment constraints on earnings varies over
the period studied. Admitted applicants experience quite a substantial
earnings loss in the few years following the admission to university. This
is in line with traditional human capital theory, since few students work
while studying. The earnings eﬀects turn positive after about four years
and increase up to year 1988. In the subsequent years the earnings diﬀer-
ences diminish, to be completely eliminated in the mid 1990s. Hence, there
are no long term eﬀects of university enrollment constraints on earnings.
The positive eﬀect of enrollment constraints on educational attainment,
thus, has no parallel in earnings. The earnings eﬀect has also been shown
to be a mirror image of the enrollment rate eﬀects. One possible explana-
tion for this pattern is that university education has no monetary eﬀects
other than forgone earnings while studying. The university enrollment
constraints have, thus, not given rise to any marked earnings inequality
between admitted and non-admitted applicants.
The return to education is estimated with both least squares and in-
38 IFAU–Do university enrollment constraints aﬀect education and earnings?strumental variables techniques over the 1990-96 period. The least squares
estimates increase with time, and are sensitive for the choice of comparison
group and model speciﬁcation. When admitted applicants are pooled with
non-applicants, the earnings eﬀect is estimated at roughly 12,500 SEK in
1996. This corresponds to about 7 per cent of the average earnings for
non-applicants. The more similar the study group is to the comparison
group, the lower is the estimates. Three quarters of the raw estimate re-
mains when pooling admitted applicants with screen-outs and controlling
for the alternative quota ﬁxed eﬀects and the admission selection determ-
inants. The best least squares estimate suggests the return to education
to be roughly 8000 SEK in 1996. This is about 4 per cent of the average
earnings for screen-outs.
The instrumental variable estimator exploits the discrete jumps in
years of education, due to the admission selection, to identify the eﬀect
of education on earnings. In 1990 the return to education is estimated at
19,000 SEK, which is about 9.5 per cent of the average earnings for screen-
outs. However, the estimates drop radically over the period. From 1993
the eﬀect is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In 1996, the point estim-
ate is actually negative. If restricting the sample to those who earn more
than 100,000 SEK in 1996, the least squares estimates rule out returns to
education in Sweden higher than 1.7 per cent.
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     Table A1 Means and standard deviations of variables used in the analysis 
                  
  Comparison group  Study group 











      
Year of birth  1958.33  1958.61  1960.79  1958.71 
 (5.89)  (5.56)  (3.87) (5.37) 
Female 0.55  0.44  0.52  0.52 
Fathers  education:      
- Basic school  0.38  0.30  0.26  0.26 
- Comprehensive school  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
- High school < 2 years  0.16  0.17  0.16  0.14 
- High school > 2 years  0.14  0.17  0.18  0.16 
- University < 2 years  0.04  0.05  0.05  0.05 
- University > 2 years  0.08  0.10  0.16  0.18 
- Graduate school  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02 
- Not available  0.16  0.16  0.12  0.15 
Mothers  education:      
- Basic school  0.44  0.37  0.32  0.31 
- Comprehensive school  0.12  0.11  0.14  0.13 
- High school < 2 years  0.18  0.19  0.21  0.18 
- High school > 2 years  0.04  0.06  0.07  0.07 
- University < 2 years  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.08 
- University > 2 years  0.05  0.06  0.09  0.11 
- Graduate school  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
- Not available  0.12  0.15  0.09  0.12 
Admission status 1982  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00 
Entry  credits   N/A   N/A  3.01  4.04 
     (0.62)  (0.59) 
Ranking of alternative    N/A    N/A  2.34  2.34 
     (2.19)  (2.31) 
N  12,416 12,823 92,085 29,791 
Notes: Non-admitted applicants are weighted by the number of admitted to non-admitted 
applicants. Admitted applicants are left unweighted. 
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1981  11.25 11.51 11.44 11.49 
 (1.00) (1.20) (1.09) (1.19) 
1982  11.44 11.80 11.83 11.86 
 (1.10) (1.07) (0.98) (1.03) 
1983  11.54 11.90 11.96 12.17 
 (0.93) (1.03) (0.97) (1.07) 
1984  11.65 12.00 12.14 12.61 
 (0.87) (1.01) (1.01) (1.24) 
1985  11.83 12.15 12.41 13.05 
 (0.89) (1.09) (1.17) (1.49) 
1986  11.92 12.26 12.65 13.41 
 (1.03) (1.19) (1.37) (1.72) 
1987  11.99 12.37 12.88 13.68 
 (1.14) (1.29) (1.59) (1.90) 
1988  12.06 12.47 13.08 13.87 
 (1.23) (1.38) (1.75) (2.01) 
1989  12.12 12.56 13.23 14.00 
 (1.30) (1.47) (1.87) (2.09) 
1990  12.16 12.63 13.33 14.09 
 (1.36) (1.56) (1.95) (2.14) 
1991  12.19 12.67 13.40 14.15 
 (1.41) (1.62) (2.01) (2.18) 
1992  12.22 12.71 13.46 14.20 
 (1.44) (1.65) (2.05) (2.21) 
1993  12.24 12.74 13.51 14.25 
 (1.47) (1.70) (2.08) (2.23) 
1994  12.26 12.77 13.55 14.28 
 (1.49) (1.74) (2.11) (2.24) 
1995  12.28 12.78 13.57 14.30 
 (1.51) (1.78) (2.13) (2.26) 
1996  12.29 12.79 13.59 14.32 
  (1.53) (1.78) (2.15) (2.27) 
N  12,416 12,823 92,085 29,791 
Notes: Non-admitted applicants are weighted by the number of admitted to non-admitted 
applicants. Admitted applicants are left unweighted. 
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  Comparison group   Study group 











        
1981  86041.5  65491.2  43500.5  68534.2 
  (68844.0) (61681.4) (45616.0) (61572.1) 
1982  97546.5  79559.3  60693.9  66051.8 
  (66619.3) (57375.9) (47196.4) (53738.0) 
1983  108935.2  88797.8  71521.1  54337.6 
  (63248.6) (59503.6) (51898.3) (54157.4) 
1984  117418.8  96265.2  75047.6  59622.8 
  (67828.0) (62776.3) (59709.8) (58498.8) 
1985  123340.6  104849.4  82959.9  78188.7 
  (68554.7) (70757.9) (62353.6) (65241.2) 
1986  133703.5  113610.9  96548.3  103263.7 
  (73170.7) (76964.6) (70249.2) (72979.3) 
1987  144405.4  128275.2  114602.0  129899.7 
  (75532.4) (79488.8) (75312.1) (79335.1) 
1988  153312.1  144604.7  132923.1  151843.7 
  (78440.0) (84564.5) (78951.4) (83305.6) 
1989  163488.8  157540.0  152682.4  170595.7 
  (83560.9) (87762.4) (84940.0) (89776.1) 
1990  169818.4  166661.6  167445.4  185543.4 
  (87763.9) (98476.5) (91065.9) (96158.2) 
1991  167473.0  165861.7  169987.7  187906.0 
  (105157.7) (105141.6) (98387.3) (111466.0) 
1992  167112.6  161708.7  173075.5  190948.5 
  (101067.4) (108558.3) (102979.4) (111753.8) 
1993  161154.9  161294.9  170927.1  188749.3 
  (114076.6) (117302.2) (126297.8) (121438.6) 
1994  166947.9  162620.2  180152.8  198873.1 
  (128355.3) (121984.2) (142568.1) (152425.0) 
1995  170313.5  168394.2  185451.4  204611.7 
  (118433.5) (124454.6) (131655.8) (148596.2) 
1996  179109.4  176579.9  197368.1  218236.8 
  (125242.8) (126270.9) (152934.2) (164242.6) 
N  12,416 12,823 92,085 29,791 
Notes: Non-admitted applicants are weighted by the number of admitted to non-admitted 
applicants. Admitted applicants are left unweighted. All numbers are in 1996 SEK. 
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